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Abstract
Iraq formally began the process of imple-
menting decentralisation in 2015, with the 
dual aims of improving service delivery 
at the local level, and curtailing the cen-
tralised bureaucracy. It is widely accepted 
that this process has not achieved what 
it set out to do, despite decentralised 
governing arrangements being broadly 
accepted in principle by both federal 
and local authorities. Based on a series 
of interviews across three provinces 
with federal and local officials that have 
direct experiences of the process, this 
paper examines the flaws in implementa-
tion of decentralisation and the resulting 
outcomes to service delivery. It seeks to 
understand why this process has yielded 
overwhelmingly negative results and 
considers how the recent political turbu-
lence in the country has impacted federal 
arrangements. The paper offers a number 
of recommendations aimed at strengthen-
ing the implementation process including 
greater clarity in roles and responsibili-
ties across federal and local authorities, 
the adoption of an incremental approach 
to rollout, and greater consideration for 
local context and political actors.
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Executive Summary
By most metrics, Iraq’s recent experience of decentralisation has been hugely disappointing. The 
devolution of powers to subnational entities, which formally began in 2015, has yet to yield any 
marked improvements in service delivery at the local level, or indeed a pronounced shift away 
from centralised forms of governance. By surveying the views of federal and local officials with 
direct experiences of the process, this paper seeks to understand why decentralisation has failed.
Our findings confirm that although decentralised governing arrangements are broadly accepted 
in principle by both federal and local authorities, the overwhelming impression is that decen-
tralisation has been poorly implemented and has yielded negative results. Not only did officials 
we interviewed struggle to cite any marked improvements to local governance, some argued 
that devolving powers to local entities has compounded mismanagement and corruption. Fur-
thermore, our findings underscore how institutional confusion about the respective powers of 
federal and local authorities under the existing decentralised framework continues to entrench 
tensions among competing stakeholders, undermining the credibility of the entire process.
This paper also analyses how the recent political turbulence in the country has impacted 
federal arrangements. Ingrained opposition to decentralisation has markedly weakened the 
powers of local authorities, and parliament’s unprecedented move in October 2019 to suspend 
provincial and district councils has shifted the balance of power back in favour of the centre.
This paper recommends the following actions:
The high commission responsible for overseeing the decentralisation process should 
conduct a thorough evaluation to identify areas where devolution of powers has been 
rushed and thus inadequately implemented. Furthermore, it should identify areas where 
the legal provisions are not being implemented, such as aspects of fiscal decentralisation. 
Sequencing the roll out of decentralisation and adopting a methodical and incremental 
approach could help address the institutional confusion that currently persists. 
Education and awareness about decentralisation should not be a mechanical exercise, 
but needs to be grounded in the Iraqi context through a detailed mapping of powers and 
authorities across federal and local entities. The gap between formal implementation 
of decentralisation and realities on the ground, where there is much confusion about 
where federal authority ends and where local authority begins, needs to be addressed. 
The legal contestations that are being played out between federal and provincial entities 
only serve to undermine the credibility of decentralisation and entrench tensions. 
Among the greatest challenges to decentralisation’s success is addressing the account-
ability deficit at the local level. Endemic corruption and political outmanoeuvring 
within provincial councils have rendered their oversight role virtually absent. This 
is compounded by weak internal auditing mechanisms at the subnational level. One 
approach is to focus on electoral reform as a means to generate greater public account-
ability of elected officials. These reforms would fall in line with amendments to the 
national elections law, namely, reducing the number of provincial council seats and 
increasing electoral districts to ensure better representation of constituency interests.
Overcoming resistance to decentralisation at the federal level should incorporate a 
two-pronged approach. Firstly, assuming that political will exists at the highest exec-
utive level, the Council of Ministers needs to exhibit greater assertiveness in resolving 
disputes. Where resistance to decentralisation at the level of federal ministries is 
unjustified, instead of allowing disputes to play out in the courts, it should be incum-
bent on the central government to actively pursue a quick and clear resolution that 
sets a procedural precedent for others to follow. 
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ملخص البحث 
وفقاً ملعظم املقاييس، كانت تجربة العراق يف تطبيق الالمركزية مخيبة لآلمال بشكل كبري. مل يسفر تفويض السلطات 
للدوائر املحلية و الذي بدأ رسمياً يف عام 2015 عن أي تحسينات ملحوظة يف تقديم الخدمات عىل املستوى املحيل، 
الفيدراليني  البحثية من خالل دراسة آراء املسؤولني  الورقة  أوعىل تغري واضح من أشكال الحكم املركزي. تسعى هذه 
واملحليني ذوي الخربات املبارشة لعملية تطبيق الالمركزية إىل فهم سبب فشل الالمركزية.
تؤكد نتائج البحث أنه عىل الرغم من أن مبادئ الحكم الالمركزي تعترب  مقبولة عىل نطاق واسع من حيث املبدأ من قبل 
كل من السلطات االتحادية واملحلية، إال أن هناك انطباعاً غامراُ بأن الالمركزية قد تم تنفيذها بشكل يسء  و قد أدت إىل 
نتائج سلبية. مل يقترص األمر عىل عجز املسؤولني الذين قابلناهم عن اإلشارة إىل أي تحسينات ملحوظة يف الحكم املحيل، 
بل ادعى البعض بأن نقل السلطات إىل الدوائر املحلية زاد من سوء اإلدارة والفساد.
االتحادية  الدوائر  بني  السلطات  تقاسم  املؤسيس حول  االرتباك  أن  إليها  توصلنا  التي  النتائج  تؤكد  و عالوة عىل ذلك، 
واملحلية يف ظل إطار الالمركزية الحايل يساهم و بشكل مستمر يف ترسيخ التوترات بني أصحاب املصلحة املتنافسني مام 
يقوض مصداقية العملية برمتها.
تحلل هذه الورقة البحثية أيضاً كيف أثرت االضطرابات السياسية األخرية يف البالد عىل الرتتيبات الفيدرالية وتوضح كيف 
أدت املعارضة املتأصلة لالمركزية إىل إضعاف السلطات املحلية بشكل ملحوظ. والجدير بالذكر أن تحرك الربملان غري 
املسبوق يف أكتوبر 2019 لتعليق مجالس املقاطعات قد أدى إىل تغيري ميزان القوى لصالح املركز.
تويص هذه الورقة باإلجراءات التالية:
يجب أن تجري املفوضية العليا املسؤولة عىل اإلرشاف عىل عملية تطبيق الالمركزية، تقييامً شامالً لتحديد املجاالت 
التي تم فيها تفويض الصالحيات عىل عجل وبالتايل مل يتم تنفيذها بشكل كاٍف. عالوة عىل ذلك، ينبغي أن تحدد 
املجاالت التي ال يتم فيها تنفيذ األحكام القانونية التي تتعلق بالالمركزية، مثل جوانب الالمركزية املالية. إن تحديد 
تسلسل واضح لتطبيق الالمركزية واعتامد نهج منهجي وتدريجي قد يؤدي اىل معالجة االرتباك املؤسيس املستمر 
حالياً. 
يجب أال يكون التثقيف والتوعية حول الالمركزية متريناً آلياً بل يجب أن يرتكز عىل فهم عميق للسياق العراقي 
الذي يتم اسرتشاده من خالل تحديد ُمفّصل للسلطات عرب الدوائر االتحادية واملحلية. يجب معالجة الفجوة بني 
السلطة  أين تنتهي  االلتباس حول  الكثري من  الواقع حيث يوجد  الرسمي لالمركزية والحقائق عىل أرض  التطبيق 
االتحادية وأين تبدأ السلطة املحلية. إن الخالفات القانونية التي تدور بني الدوائر االتحادية واملحلية ال تؤدي إال إىل 
تقويض مصداقية الالمركزية وترسيخ التوترات. 
الفساد  أدى  الالمركزية.  نجاح  تواجه  التي  التحديات  أكرب  تعد من  املحيل  املستوى  املساءلة عىل  انعدام  معالجة 
املسترشي والرصاعات السياسية داخل مجالس املحافظات إىل جعل دورها الرقايب غائباً تقريباً و تفاقم ذلك بسبب 
الرتكيز عىل اإلصالح االنتخايب كوسيلة تؤدي  الداخلية عىل املستوى املحيل. أحد السبل هو  الرقابة  ضعف آليات 
اىل قدر أكرب من املساءلة العامة للمسؤولني املنتخبني. وستتوافق هذه اإلصالحات مع تعديالت قانون االنتخابات 
و تحديداً تقليص عدد مقاعد مجالس املحافظات وزيادة الدوائر االنتخابية لضامن متثيل أفضل ملصالح الناخبني. 
التغلب عىل معارضة الالمركزية عىل املستوى االتحادي يجب أن يتضمن نهجاً ذا شقني. أوالً، عىل افرتاض أن اإلرادة 
الحزم يف حل  أكرب من  إظهار قدر  إىل  يحتاج  الوزراء  فإن مجلس  تنفيذي،  السياسية موجودة عىل أعىل مستوى 
السامح بخوض  فبدالً من  االتحادية غري مربرة  الوزارات  الالمركزية عىل مستوى  تكون معارضة  النزاعات. عندما 
النزاعات يف املحاكم، ينبغي أن يكون من واجب الحكومة املركزية السعى إىل إيجاد حل رسيع وواضح يشكل سابقة 
إجرائية ليتبعها اآلخرون.
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Introduction
Decentralisation has had a demonstrably positive impact on governance and political sta-
bility in many countries. But the transition in Iraq from a highly centralised state to a 
federal arrangement has generated much turbulence. As Iraq’s first Voluntary National 
Review on sustainable development goals explains, the transformation created ‘institu-
tional confusion and rivalry’ between federal and local institutions. The glaring asymmetry 
of institutional capacities between national and subnational entities is one reason why 
the balance of power was unable to shift significantly, since ‘local [c]apabilities do not 
provide effective frameworks for coordination, data collection and policy analysis.’1 
This paper seeks to build on our understanding of what went wrong in Iraq through a 
series of interviews conducted in three provinces exploring perceptions of how decen-
tralisation has impacted service delivery at provincial level, the key obstacles, how these 
could be overcome and how international assistance efforts have been received. Some 13 
people were interviewed in January and February 2020 including local officials in Anbar, 
Basra and Baghdad provinces, representing the governor’s offices, provincial councils 
and municipalities. Anbar was chosen because of its significance as one of the provinces 
that was liberated from Daesh and hence vitally in need of reconstruction; Basra holds a 
central role as the lynchpin of Iraq’s economy; and Baghdad was chosen to understand if 
its experience of decentralisation was significantly different. At the federal level, we spoke 
with officials in the ministries of health; housing, construction and municipalities; labour 
and public works; the Mayoralty of Baghdad; and the High Commission for Coordinating 
among Provinces (HCCP). Insights are also informed by numerous informal conversa-
tions with officials in the Council of Ministers. 
This paper argues that rather than helping to alleviate dysfunctional governing arrange-
ments, decentralisation has mostly exacerbated incoherence within Iraqi state structures. 
Institutional constraints have hampered the ability of subnational entities to absorb and 
utilise delegated powers because state institutions lack sufficient organisational coher-
ence and functional resilience. As a result, in many respects, the transfer of powers to 
subnational entities simply compounded dysfunctions at the local level and exacerbated 
deficits in governance such as corruption and mismanagement. This resulted in pushback 
from federal authorities and a partial reversing of decentralisation, such as amendments 
to the law that formally reinstated delegated powers within the ministries of health and 
education to federal control.
Furthermore, the lack of political cohesion at the national level meant that there was 
insufficient political will and focus on the part of the central government to see through 
the decentralisation process to its intended finality. The infighting and intransigence at 
the provincial level also reinforced longstanding resistance from federal ministries to 
1   Government of Iraq, ‘First Voluntary National Review on Sustainable Development Goals’, UN Sus-
tainable Development Goals, June 2019. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/23789Iraq_VNR_2019_final_EN_HS.pdf (accessed 5 April 2020).
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relinquish powers in accordance with the decentralisation law and generated so much 
resentment that parliament eventually moved to suspend all provincial and district coun-
cils and assume their oversight authority.
Secondly, the paper argues that decentralisation was ill-conceived because it failed to 
sequence the process in a manner that could have given it a chance to succeed. The archi-
tects of the process focused heavily on administrative decentralisation and paid little 
attention to fiscal and political decentralisation. As a result, the shift in intergovernmen-
tal balance of power was minimal and tensions were exacerbated as provincial authorities 
persisted in their claims over financial resources from local revenue generation. All while 
democratic legitimacy at the provincial level was eroded because of the failure to hold 
timely elections or conduct much needed electoral reform. 
Thirdly, the views of stakeholders outlined below underscore the need to undertake a 
thorough evaluation of decentralisation before any progress can be made to rectify the 
process. A strategy to overcome the underlying obstacles and constraints should then be 
formulated, namely, resistance from federal institutions to cede powers in accordance 
with the law; the lack of political will among parties to support the process; contentions 
over interpreting the decentralisation law and where respective powers between federal 
and local authorities lie; weak provincial administrative capacity to absorb new powers; 
and pervasive corruption that impedes effective decision-making. In order to resolve these 
issues, a much more robust dialogue between stakeholders is needed, one that currently 
does not exist beyond ad hoc and excessively formal high-level meetings. 
Setting the Scene
Iraq had effectively no experience in decentralisation prior to 2003. Even though Law 
159 of 1969 empowered local administrations with authorities over security and public 
services, in practice there was no degree of autonomy since decisions were dictated by 
Baghdad and implemented through local officials appointed by the Ba’ath Party.2 Article 
116 of the Iraqi constitution of 2005 forms the basis for a decentralised framework, stating, 
‘The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, 
and governorates, as well as local administrations.’3
Attempts to activate this constitutional provision first emerged in 2008 with the passing 
of the decentralisation law, known as Law 21, which codified the administrative and legal 
framework for decentralisation. The political imperative for decentralisation was predi-
cated on a broader rationale for instituting federalism as a cornerstone of the post-2003 
order. Viewed as a way to check the rise of future authoritarian tendencies, this sought to 
reconcile the reality of an autonomous Kurdistan Region that had existed since 1991 and 
embrace the redistribution of power away from the centre. In other words, empowering 
2   USAID, ‘Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region, as amended by Law 15 of 2010 and 
footnoted’, 2011. 
3   Constitution of Iraq, 2005.
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local authorities through decentralisation was a means to reconfigure power dynamics in 
order to generate greater buy-in from Iraq’s diverse communities.
As Iraq began to emerge from a costly sectarian conflict in 2008, it appeared an appro-
priate time to implement decentralisation. But the government proceeded with extreme 
caution, not least because of fears that it could unravel the country’s fragile unity. These 
fears were compounded by a conflation between decentralisation and regionalism, noto-
riously perpetuated by the so-called ‘Biden plan’ in 2006, which was essentially viewed by 
many as the partitioning of Iraq along ethnosectarian lines.4 Calls for regionalism among 
Iraq’s Sunni Arab leaders intensified over the following years, leaving little appetite for the 
central government to pursue decentralisation.
It was only in 2015 when the transfer of administrative powers to the provinces in accord-
ance with Law 21 commenced, after former prime minister Haider al-Abadi issued Executive 
Order 34.5 The effort was led by the High Commission for Coordinating among Provinces 
(HCCP), a central body that monitored and evaluated the decentralisation process and 
created a platform to bring together federal ministers and provincial governors to resolve 
outstanding issues. Monthly meetings were convened by the prime minister with all the 
governors and chairs of provincial councils to review progress and discuss impediments. 
A secretariat for the HCCP oversaw the technical details related to the transfer of powers, 
led by Torhan Mufti with the rank of minister of state, that drew on the bureaucratic and 
legal resources of the cabinet secretariat. 
Although the HCCP’s authority was vaguely mentioned in Article 45 of the original version 
of Law 21, subsequent amendments to the law clarified its remit. Key functions include 
its role in resolving disputes between the centre and periphery; devising a mechanism for 
how the central government and provinces would manage shared authorities; and facil-
itating the transfer of administrative and fiscal powers from eight federal ministries to 
the provinces, in accordance with Law 21. The slated ministries were municipalities and 
public works, construction and housing, labour and social affairs, education, health, agri-
culture, youth and sports, and finance.6
Law 21 is made up of over 50 articles that define the types of administrative units including 
provinces, districts (qadhaʾ) and sub-districts (nahiya); the process by which members 
are elected onto them; their powers and competencies; and powers pertaining to the gen-
eration of local revenues. Core to the devolution process was to map out and transfer 
hundreds of federal functions belonging to the eight ministries to dozens of directorates 
4   Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb, ‘Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq’, The New York Times, 1 May 2006. 
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/opinion/01biden.html (accessed 5 April 2020).
5   For a detailed explanation of why decentralisation became viable in 2015, see Ali Al-Mawlawi, ‘Func-
tioning Federalism in Iraq: A Critical Perspective’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 11 March 2018. Available at: 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/03/11/functioning-federalism-in-iraq-a-critical-perspective/ (accessed 
5 April 2020).
6   ‘Second Amendment to Law of the Provinces Not Incorporated Into Regions’, Constitution Net. 
Available at: http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/the_second_amendment_law_for_the_for_
non-regional_provinces_no._21_the_year_2008.pdf (accessed 5 April 2020).
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at the local level that were now taking orders from local governments. This included trans-
ferring authority for tens of thousands of public employees over to the responsibility of 
provincial authorities. For example, Baghdad province expanded its payroll from 90,000 
employees to 325,000, including healthcare professionals and teachers.7
There was a broad consensus among officials interviewed in 2020 that there remained 
a long way to go. Asked about the extent to which they felt decentralisation had been 
achieved, responses varied, from only 20% according to an official in Basra, 30% according 
to officials in Anbar and Baghdad provincial council, to 60% and 75% according to offi-
cials in the governor’s offices in Baghdad and Anbar. The HCCP’s assessment was more 
philosophical, offering the view that decentralisation is an ongoing process that requires a 
long-term approach. Such a response is expected, since the HCCP holds primary respon-
sibility for implementing decentralisation and managing expectations about when the 
process will bear fruit. Indeed there is a clear mismatch between the technical transfer of 
powers on the one hand, and the impact for local governance on the other. In February 
2019, Mufti claimed that most of the provinces (with the exception of liberated provinces) 
had completed the transfer process.8
The incoherence in the process described by stakeholders culminated in 2018 – and was 
spurred on by strong federal resistance and the failure of local authorities to absorb and 
harness their new powers effectively – when parliament moved to partially reverse the 
decentralisation process. The original version of Law 21 had authorised the decentrali-
sation of eight federal ministries, but such was Baghdad’s level of dissatisfaction at the 
performance of local authorities in managing health facilities and schools that by May 
2018, parliament passed a third amendment to the decentralisation law that reinstated 
Baghdad’s authority over the ministries of education and health.9 Despite protests from 
provincial governors who lodged legal challenges against the amendment, the Supreme 
Court upheld parliament’s decision, finding no constitutional infraction.10 
This episode sheds light on the complex power struggles that have played out between 
the centre and periphery. Members of parliament view decentralisation as diluting their 
authority by undermining the role of oversight, yet most of the leading parties in par-
liament are represented at the provincial level. By the same token, even if the central 
government is convinced by the decentralisation agenda, the coalition nature of govern-
ment means that individuals and parties represented at the ministerial level will be more 
inclined to resist the diminishing of the powers of ministries. 
7   Mike Fleet, ‘Decentralization and its Discontents in Iraq’, Middle East Institute, 25 September 2019. 
Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/decentralization-and-its-discontents-iraq (accessed 5 
April 2020).
8   Sout Al-Iraq, ‘Transfer of 70% of federal government authorities to the liberated provinces’, 26 Febru-
ary 2019. Available at: https://goo.gl/SMby81 (accessed 25 April 2020).
9   ‘Third Amendment to the Law of the Provinces Not Incorporated Into Regions’, Ministry of Justice, 16 
April 2018. Available at: https://www.moj.gov.iq/upload/pdf/4487.pdf (accessed 5 April 2020).
10 Federal Supreme Court, 2018. Available at: https://www.iraqfsc.iq/krarat/1/2018/80_fed_2018.pdf 
(accessed 6 April 2020).
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Parliament Suspends Provincial Councils
A second milestone came in October 2019 when parliament decided to suspend all pro-
vincial and district councils as a response to the demands of the protest movement that 
emerged earlier that month. Provincial councils were widely seen as ridden with corrup-
tion and paralysed by political infighting. A significant portion of public anger at state 
failures was directed at local councils and parliament used the opportunity to frame its 
decision as an anti-corruption measure. As the speaker of parliament, Mohammed al-Hal-
bousi, put it, the move was an attempt to ‘raise the standard of services and halt the real 
problems and violations in the provinces’.11 Parliament predicated its decision on Article 
20 of the decentralisation law; this authorises parliament to suspend a provincial council 
where ‘gross dereliction of duties’ has occurred. But using Article 20 as legal cover for 
suspending all provincial councils was highly questionable even though the government 
supported the decision.12 To illustrate the extent of the government’s U-turn on this issue, 
Torhan Mufti had been asked earlier in the year about the possibility of dissolving provin-
cial councils and responded that it would be unconstitutional.13
Opinions are divided about what primarily motivated parliament to take this action and 
whether it was the right decision. For executive authorities in the provinces, the councils 
were often seen as obstructive, corruption-ridden and an unnecessary burden on public 
spending. This was explicitly stated by interviewed officials working for provincial gover-
nors, including within Anbar’s municipality. But there was also a clear acknowledgement 
that parliament’s decision was politically motivated. 
In Basra, one official explained the move as an attempt by MPs to remove the oversight 
role of provincial councils, thereby handing that responsibility to parliament so it could 
interfere in local decision-making and gain access to illicit deals through local capital 
projects. In Anbar, the move was seen by an official in the governor’s office as a rushed 
attempt to quell public anger. A member of Baghdad’s provincial council also asserted 
that they had been scapegoated, but acknowledged that the political infighting within the 
council had contributed to their poor performance. Nevertheless, in his view, the primary 
goal was to remove oversight in order to give the governors – all of whom are tied to 
parties in parliament – free reign over decision-making in the province. 
Tensions between governors and provincial councils were apparent across Iraq, where 
there were persistent efforts to impeach and remove governors from office. For instance, 
in 2017, the governors of all three liberated provinces were sacked by their respective coun-
11   Council of Representatives, ‘Third Session’, YouTube, 8 October 2018. Available at: https://youtu.be/
JKS_M6BaV8c?t=716 (accessed 5 April 2020).
12   Ali Al-Mawlawi, ‘Is the Decentralisation Process Being Reversed in Iraq?’, LSE Middle East Centre 
Blog, 2 December 2019. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/12/02/is-the-decentralisation-pro-
cess-in-iraq-being-reversed/ (accessed 6 April 2020).
13   Asia TV, ‘Torhan Mufti: It is not possible to dissolve provincial councils except through a constitutional 
amendment’, YouTube, 22 January 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWUFeIlmtrw 
(accessed 3 April 2020).
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cils. In every case, party politics was the dominant driver in the impeachment process. The 
governor of Anbar, who belonged to the Iraqi Islamic Party, was replaced by Mohammed 
al-Halbousi from a rival party.14 Struggles between governors and provincial councils have 
even been mediated by the courts. When the Wasit provincial council voted out Governor 
Mohammed al-Mayahi in 2019, the decision had to be considered by an administrative 
court after Mayahi appealed that the no confidence procedure had been violated because 
the council had not held a session to question him first.15 
Provincial governors are clearly satisfied with the current void and will seek, along with 
their political backers, to ensure that the suspension of provincial councils endures 
for as long as possible. In April 2020, Najaf ’s governor, Luay Al-Yaseri, described the 
impact of this new reality on his work in the province. He lamented the destabilising 
impact of political ‘struggles’ between provincial council members and his office that 
had impeded his ability to work, adding that he now enjoyed greater ability to approve 
capital projects, streamline decision-making and avoid outside interference. As he 
explained, since many provincial public servants are tied to political parties, his ability 
to remove or transfer them was seriously curtailed by objections from council members 
with political interests.16
While there are no expectations that provincial councils will be reinstated in the near-
term, it does appear to be a temporary measure until local elections can be organised. 
Indeed, as one council member in Anbar insisted, provincial councils are explicitly men-
tioned in Article 122 of the constitution, meaning that even if parliament was within its 
rights to suspend them because their electoral term had expired, it would not be possible 
to scrap them altogether. 
The absence of provincial councils also has created a legal conundrum over how vacant 
posts for governors should be filled because Article 122(c) explicitly states that gover-
nors should be elected by provincial councils. This question became a matter of practical 
urgency when the governor of Dhi Qar province resigned in response to largescale violence 
when demonstrations reached a boiling point in November 2019.17 The issue remained 
unresolved for five months until Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi decided to exercise execu-
tive authority to appoint Judge Nadhim Al-Waeli as governor. 
The executive order cited Article 78 of the Constitution in a vague reference to the prime 
minister’s general authority as convener of the Council of Ministers, but the decision was 
met with much scepticism. Asked to explain the legal basis for his appointment, the new 
governor noted that in the absence of the provincial council, authority now fell to the 
14   Al-Mawlawi, ‘Functioning Federalism in Iraq’.
15   ‘Administrative court approves sacking of Wasit governor’, Baghdad Today, 24 December 2019. Availa-
ble at: https://bit.ly/2MumUy1 (accessed 13 April 2020).
16   Al-Iraqiya, ‘Najaf governor: Freezing of provincial councils improved matters’, YouTube, 26 April 2020. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9hGhfv088w&t=2s (accessed 27 April 2020).
17   Anadolu Agency, ‘Dhi Qar governor resigns in response to bloody events’, 29 November 2019. Availa-
ble at: https://bit.ly/2BKBcbX (accessed 3 February 2020).
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Council of Ministers to appoint governors.18 Abdul Mahdi’s executive order could be rea-
sonably challenged since it was not based on cabinet’s approval, nor did it involve any 
role for parliament, which retains powers to dismiss governors, meaning a formal legal 
challenge to Waeli’s appointment is likely.
There is no doubt that Iraq’s federal structure has taken a major hit; trust and confidence 
in the ability of local authorities to deliver results is very low; and therefore the relevance 
of decentralisation to Iraq’s governance framework is being questioned.
General Perceptions of Decentralisation
Public discourse over decentralisation is noticeably scant, making it difficult to iden-
tify specific positions or differences between the ruling elite. During the 2018 national 
election campaigns, there was no noticeable debate over decentralisation as a policy or 
electoral issue. However, discussions in parliament over the third amendment to Law 
21 in 2018 shed some light on the interests of MPs. A central concern was constraining 
the powers of provincial councils, most notably those linked to their role in appointing 
senior officials in the province. MPs insisted that although provincial councils could 
nominate individuals and the governor would then choose his/her preferred choice, 
final approval should still fall to the relevant federal minister. As one Sadrist MP noted, 
ceding too much authority to provincial councils over the appointment process would 
render these positions subject to illicit deals and bribery.19 A cynical view would suggest 
that parliament’s intention was to ensure that MPs maintained firm control as benefi-
ciaries of these illicit dealings.
A key factor in ensuring that decentralisation yields positive outcomes is political will 
at the federal and local levels. We explored the perceptions of officials within federal 
and provincial governments towards decentralisation to understand how they assess the 
process as a whole. The findings show that they hold overwhelmingly positive views about 
decentralisation in principle, but Iraq’s experience in devolving powers is largely viewed 
in a negative light. This suggests a good degree of acceptance towards the notion that local 
authorities should bear greater responsibility for delivering services, but a clear failing in 
planning and execution of the decentralisation process.
Multiple officials at the federal and local levels reiterated this point: that their reser-
vations towards the process stem from the view that what currently exists does not 
truly reflect the aspirations and intended consequences of decentralisation. Much 
18   Hussein al-Amil, ‘New Dhi Qar governor assumes his role through a controversial executive order’, 
Al-Mada, 4 May 2020. Available at: https://www.almadapaper.net/view.php?cat=226503 (accessed 4 May 
2020).
19   Council of Representatives, ‘Transcript of Session 4’, 14 January 2020. Available at: https://arb.parlia-
ment.iq/archive/2018/01/14/محضر-جلسـة-رقم4--األحد-2018-1-14-م (accessed 28 April 2020).
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of the research suggests that this is because the necessary prerequisites for ensuring 
the success of the process had not been established. As a Ministry of Health official 
explained, ‘the conditions for success were not created, [t]he timing and sequencing 
were not correct.’ As others also pointed out, Iraq’s long history of highly centralised 
governance meant that a reconfiguration in power centres would require a massive 
undertaking in shifting mindsets and generating a sufficient degree of buy-in. This 
begins with a genuine commitment from Iraq’s highest executive authorities and con-
sensus among the governing elite, without which, the entire process is compromised. 
But it also requires officials at the subnational level to accept greater responsibility for 
the failures within their jurisdiction.
In its defence, the HCCP emphasised the importance of education and raising awareness 
about the decentralisation process among key stakeholders, insisting that the first stage in 
its multi-year strategy sought to improve general understanding about how decentralised 
arrangements work and their implications for roles and responsibilities at every level. It is 
clear, however, that these efforts were insufficient. The lack of understanding about newly 
devolved powers and how they should be utilised was a common theme among those we 
interviewed. Several officials lamented that the process had been rushed, with little clarity 
about how powers between the centre and periphery had been demarcated, casting doubt 
about whether it was in line with Law 21. As an official within the Basra municipality put 
it, ‘decentralisation would have been positive if it had been implemented in a legal and 
proper way.’
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, some officials claim decentralisation has pro-
duced two encouraging outcomes. First, as officials within Anbar governor’s office and 
municipality asserted, there has been a notable improvement in the way bureaucratic 
procedures are processed. With greater autonomy from Baghdad, they assert that deci-
sion-making processes are quicker and there is less red tape to deal with. Of course, it is 
also possible that local officials could seek to profit from corruption by imposing their 
own bureaucratic hurdles, making processes more complicated than they were to begin 
with. Secondly, the HCCP claimed that decentralisation addressed a key source of politi-
cal instability, namely, that calls for regionalisation had diminished. 
The notion that Baghdad’s embrace of decentralisation had scuppered these inclinations 
is of course highly debatable, but the HCCP’s viewpoint sheds light on an aspect of its 
rationale for embarking on decentralisation. Drawing this causal link is difficult because 
of statistically confounding factors. Iraq was in the midst of a war with ISIS when Law 21 
was first implemented. The politicians from provinces that were most vocal about creat-
ing a region were now under ISIS occupation and there was little political appetite for this 
issue. Nor was regionalisation seen as a solution to Iraq’s problems at a time when these 
provinces were heavily dependent on federal forces including the army and police to take 
back their cities. 
16 Confusion and Contention: Understanding the Failings of Decentralisation in Iraq
Nevertheless, in 2018 and 2019 those calls were resurrected, this time in Basra in response 
to public anger over squalid living conditions.20 Basra’s woes reflect the collective failure 
of governance across the country, albeit these are more pronounced there. The contami-
nation of drinking water in the summer of 2018 that led to over 100,000 hospitalisations 
is illustrative of the institutional incoherence. Work to address water and sanitation short-
falls in Basra involved no less than eight ministries and departments, six local agencies 
and the governor’s office.21
Decentralising Service Delivery
Since the rationale for decentralisation focusses primarily on improving the effectiveness 
of governance, one of the hallmarks of success is measured by improvements in service 
delivery at the local level. Based on this criterion, decentralisation has been a resound-
ing failure according to officials we interviewed. In fact, from the perspective of the 
central government including the health ministry, not only have services not improved, 
but they have regressed. Nationwide polling from 2018 confirms this view. According to 
the National Democratic Institute, 59% of respondents believed that basic services were 
getting worse, an increase of 9% compared to earlier in the year. Public trust in district and 
provincial councils also fell to less than a third.22 
However, officials in Anbar assert that there have been limited improvements in the com-
pletion of small capital projects that were agreed by local and federal authorities. This 
highlights the fact that where there is agreement between the federal and local author-
ities, it is possible for the benefits of decentralisation to be realised. Indeed, there was 
agreement among officials in Anbar and Baghdad provinces that decision-making and 
bureaucratic procedures have been sped up, but only in instances where the central gov-
ernment has not objected to local authorities exercising their autonomy. An important 
point raised by the Anbar governor’s office is that in many cases, the employees working 
in decentralised departments will still bear allegiance to their ministries over local exec-
utive authorities, thereby undermining the province’s ability to assert its will in matters 
disputed by federal entities.
20   Omar Sattar, ‘Iraq’s Basra seeks to upgrade to federal region,’ Al-Monitor, 26 April 2019. Available 
at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/04/iraq-basra-region-federalism.html (accessed 17 
April 2020).
21   Sajad Jiyad, ‘Failure of Governance in Basra Puts All of Iraq at Risk’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 
2 April 2020. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/04/02/failure-of-governance-in-basra-puts-
all-of-iraq-at-risk/ (accessed 5 April 2020).
22   National Democratic Institute, ‘NDI Poll: Iraqis Call on the New Government for Jobs, Services 
and Reconstruction’, 20 November 2018. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-ira-
qis-call-new-government-jobs-services-and-reconstruction-august-october (accessed 31 July 2020).
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Obstacles to Decentralisation
Understanding the variety of obstacles and constraints to decentralisation is key to devis-
ing an appropriate strategy to move forward. Among the most notable issues cited by 
interviewed officials include:
Resistance from federal authorities to cede powers. From the perspective of local offi-
cials, federal authorities are still unwilling to accept the power sharing arrangements 
stipulated in Law 21, whereas federal officials will assert that provisions within the 
law have been misconstrued, resulting in instances where they will seek to overturn 
administrative decisions made at the local level. This includes objections from the 
finance ministry over local revenue generation. The Maysan local government tried 
to impose a surcharge for issuing passports; it was opposed by the finance ministry 
and the Supreme Court ruled in its favour.23 Appointments of senior officials by gov-
ernors is another common point of contention. In 2017, the governor of Mosul sacked 
the head of the province’s municipalities and appointed himself in an acting position. 
The municipalities minister responded swiftly with a letter claiming that the official 
was an employee of the ministry and therefore the governor did not have authority to 
remove him.24
Lack of political will was cited by the HCCP as an impediment on three counts. First, the 
resistance from ministries to concede their authorities; among political actors who 
had ambitions of regionalisation and believed that decentralisation would undermine 
their case; and thirdly, among the older generation of civil servants who are set in their 
ways and unwilling to adapt. Some of this resistance is exhibited in successive amend-
ments to Law 21, which have tended to claw back powers to federal authorities, such 
as giving a greater say to federal ministers over senior appointments in the provinces 
and limiting the extent of fiscal decentralisation by constraining the share of locally 
generated revenues that are owed to the province.
Unclear demarcation between the powers of federal and local authorities. Not only does 
Law 21 require greater clarity about the respective powers of the central government 
and the provinces, but, as the Ministry of Labour underscored, there are numerous 
contradictions between older legislation and bylaws that undermine the principles 
of decentralisation. This type of confusion was expressed by officials at both the 
federal and local levels. Indeed, a commonly cited area of contention concerns fiscal 
decentralisation. Despite the provisions laid out in Article 45 of Law 21 that grant local 
authorities the right to generate local revenues and establish greater control to manage 
their financial resources, this issue is among the most hotly contested. The political 
23   Federal Supreme Court, 8 July 2014. Available at: https://www.iraqfsc.iq/krarat/1/2013/82_fed_2013.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2020).
24  Noor News, ‘Ministry of Municipalities renews affirmation to Ninewa governor about his lack of 
authority to sack the municipalities director’, 13 June 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/36ZflZJ (accessed 
5 April 2020).
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economy drivers of this resistance are intuitive: an unwillingness by the finance min-
istry to cede control over budgetary allocations and spending that would dilute its 
authority; and concerns over how the balance of power across the country would be 
disrupted. The latter point was reiterated by the Ministry of Labour, which expressed 
concerns about the implications of unequal distribution of state revenues. 
The lack of administrative capacity at the local level to absorb new powers. This was reit-
erated by a number of officials who asserted that the failure to provide requisite 
training and technical assistance to local administrations has left local authorities 
heavily dependent on federal administrative assistance, namely in dealing with finan-
cial and human resources management. A notable example is provincial budgeting. 
Both Law 21 and public financial management legislation require local governments to 
draft annual budgets through a consultative process before submitting to the finance 
ministry to incorporate within the federal budget. But their inexperience and lack of 
expertise means that the process is largely dictated by the federal government in a 
top-down fashion. Arguably there has been progress in some provinces through pro-
grammatic training to raise the quality of budgeting standards, demonstrating how 
weaknesses in administrative capacity can be overcome through a process of iterative 
learning and adaptation.25
Pervasive corruption that impedes effective decision-making processes. Political dynamics 
at the local level have also impeded the ability of local authorities to utilise their new 
powers effectively. In all three provinces, officials complained that competing party 
interests and rivalries were stagnating the work of provincial councils and undermin-
ing the day to day functions of executive authorities. As one official in Anbar governor’s 
office explained, senior civil servants who were either failing to perform or engaged 
in corruption enjoyed political protection from individuals or parties within the pro-
vincial councils. Bargaining over illicit interests among competing elites is common 
before an agreement can be reached. Not surprisingly, federal officials claimed that 
corruption was more pronounced on the provincial level. Indeed, every province has 
been gripped with unrelenting political turmoil caused by entrenched attempts by 
governors and provincial council members to undermine each other. These disputes 
have had such a disruptive impact on the functioning of local governments that, from 
the perspective of many in Baghdad, it would be irresponsible to afford them with so 
much authority.
Lack of strategic sequencing to phase in decentralisation. This is a point emphasised by 
several officials in Anbar and Baghdad provinces. Understanding that decentralisa-
tion cannot be implemented wholesale but rather through a sequenced approach is a 
hallmark of best practice around the world. This approach recognises that decentral-
isation is a process of public policy reforms rather than a state of being, nor does it 
happen with the flick of a switch; and that devolving powers should proceed in a cal-
culated and incremental manner if it is to succeed in altering the intergovernmental 
25   Fleet, ‘Decentralization and its Discontents in Iraq’.
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balance of power.26 Resistance from stakeholders is inevitable and sequencing should 
bear a relationship to the gradual building of capacities at the subnational level. But 
capacities of local authorities can only be truly developed through experience. 
If the decentralisation process is rushed, it can lead to a backlash from institutions required 
to devolve powers, or loss of faith with those that are unable to effectively utilise their new 
authorities. Furthermore, it is worth considering the three primary categories of decen-
tralisation, namely, administrative, fiscal and political; and in what order they should be 
rolled out to ensure maximum impact. When administrative powers are delegated before 
fiscal powers, local authorities often remain weak and vulnerable to undue interference 
from national authorities. Similarly, if political decentralisation such as electoral reform 
that creates greater accountability does not occur, administrative and fiscal decentral-
isation risk undermining democratic accountability by conferring too much power on 
unrepresentative bodies.
How to Reboot Decentralisation
A number of suggestions to overcome the obstacles to decentralisation were offered 
by officials we interviewed. Firstly, better training to build capacity and understanding 
in order to adequately navigate the legal and administrative minefield was a common 
demand. Secondly, as authorities in Baghdad provincial council pointed out, more efforts 
are needed to raise public awareness and understanding about decentralisation by uti-
lising media platforms. Here it is relevant to elaborate on stakeholder perceptions of the 
international community’s role in supporting the decentralisation process. Across the 
board, officials we spoke to described the contribution of international organisations as 
limited in scope and impact with a focus only on education and awareness about the 
general principles of decentralisation. Perceptions were particularly poor in Baghdad 
province; an official in Basra said he believed the few workshops that were held were for 
media consumption only and none of the outcomes were implemented; while in Anbar 
there was a more positive impression overall. 
A Ministry of Health official said that international organisations had rushed into rolling 
out programmes without listening enough to the concerns and expectations of Iraqi 
stakeholders. This view was reiterated at the Ministry of Housing, Construction and 
Municipalities, where an official said the workshops were too theoretical and ‘lacked an 
understanding of day to day issues and how local administrations were implementing 
decentralisation’. Interestingly, these largely negative views contrast with the HCCP’s over-
whelmingly positive impression of their role in reinforcing the decentralisation process in 
the provinces. This mismatch may also reflect an insufficient feedback loop that would be 
vital to enhancing the effectiveness of international assistance.
26   Tulia G. Falleti, ‘A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin America Cases in Comparative Per-
spective’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3.
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Thirdly, greater assertiveness by the central government to force ministries to comply 
with Law 21 was emphasised by the Anbar governor’s office. In many instances, inter-
ventions at the highest level of government can help resolve disputes faster and without 
resorting to legal recourse, which often just compounds tensions. As the Wasit governor, 
Mohammed Al-Mayahi, suggests, the HCCP’s function ought to extend beyond coordi-
nation and assume executive powers to bridge the gap between national and subnational 
entities and enable them to address challenges together.27
Fourthly, among the most common demands was the need to institute more effective 
monitoring and auditing mechanisms to evaluate the performance of local authorities. 
This is something that Anbar officials suggested in addition to the HCCP, which noted 
that assessment teams were already in place at the provincial level. But in the absence of 
functioning provincial councils, direct oversight responsibility belongs to parliament. In 
this regard, testimonies from a number of governors have suggested that MPs representing 
their respective provinces are now working more closely with governors to fill that void.  
Finally, accountability can be enhanced through electoral reform. There are limitations 
to what changes can be made to the provincial elections law because of constitutional 
provisions that stipulate an explicit role for provincial councils in electing governors. 
However, it is theoretically possible to adopt a similar approach used to amend the 
parliamentary elections law. Reducing the number of elected seats within the provincial 
councils could curtail the degree of infighting and interference with executive officials. 
This is a point that one official within Baghdad provincial council advocated, adding 
that if governors were to be chosen through a majoritarian approach rather than through 
consensus, it would reduce the amount of bargaining required, and in turn the governor 
would be less beholden to political factions. A second approach would be to reduce the 
size of electoral districts so that elected officials would be more accountable to constit-
uents, a measure that was supported by the Basra municipality. Combining these two 
measures would also address concerns about adequate representation in provinces that 
have heterogenous communities. 
Ultimately, any endeavour to reevaluate the decentralisation process and address electoral 
reform should be framed within a broader effort to salvage state legitimacy and remedy 
deep-seated flaws in Iraq’s governance. Embracing decentralisation as a means to achiev-
ing these goals is by no means an inevitability. Iraq should learn the lessons of its recent 
experience and choose a path that works for its specific circumstances. 
27  Al-Iraqiya, ‘Wasit governor: clear division between the federal government and the provinces’, 
YouTube, 26 April 2020. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kHniFNqTl8&t=1s (accessed 
27 April 2020).
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